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ABSTRACT—Congress paid nearly no attention to the Constitution when
enacting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. Legislative hearings and
committee reports ignored the Constitution altogether; legislative debates
largely did the same. This Essay both highlights Congress’s indifference to
the Constitution when enacting the ACA and examines the reasons behind
this legislative failure. In particular, this Essay advances three explanations.
First, Congress is generally uninterested in “public goods” like
constitutional interpretation. Second, the polarization of Democrats and
Republicans in Congress further depresses Congress’s interest in thinking
about the Constitution; instead, the majority party seeks to limit
opportunities for the minority party to raise constitutional objections to
legislation. Third, there is no federalism constituency in Congress that
pushes lawmakers to take federalism into account when enacting
legislation. For this very reason, Republican lawmakers almost always
attacked the ACA on policy, rather than on constitutional, grounds. While
embracing these three explanations, this Essay rejects a fourth explanation,
namely, that lawmakers had no reason to know that the ACA would be
subject to vigorous constitutional attack. Finally, this Essay argues that
congressional disinterest in constitutional federalism supports the Supreme
Court’s establishment of boundaries that limit Congress’s Commerce
Clause power. At the same time, this Essay does not endorse the action–
inaction distinction advanced by five Justices in the ACA decision.
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INTRODUCTION
When enacting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),1
the 111th Congress paid scant attention to possible constitutional challenges
to their signature achievement. No constitutional hearings were held,
committee reports did not discuss the Act’s constitutionality, and legislative
debates largely ignored constitutional objections to the Act.2 Why did
lawmakers seemingly drop this ball?
In the lead-up to National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB),3 various theories were launched and various culprits
identified. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Michael McConnell argued
that “[t]he drafters and defenders of the health-care law have only
themselves to blame for this mess . . . [as] they did not take seriously their

1

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
2
For a somewhat competing account, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and
the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011). Professor Zietlow, looking at statements made
on the floor of Congress about the constitutionality of the ACA, suggests that Congress did take the
Constitution into account when enacting the ACA. See id. at 1395–1401. Professor Zietlow, however,
does not examine the legislative process leading up to that floor debate. For reasons discussed in Neal
Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011), statements made in the Congressional Record are an inadequate
measure of Congress’s interest in the Constitution. See id. at 766–68. More than that, although Professor
Zietlow does an excellent job showcasing the number of lawmakers who spoke about the
constitutionality of the ACA, I nonetheless argue in this Essay that lawmakers were not particularly
interested in constitutional questions when debating the ACA.
3
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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obligation to” interpret the Constitution and act within its bounds.4 In a
vigorous defense of congressional Democrats that appeared in Salon,
Andrew Koppelman claimed that the bill’s supposed constitutional
shortcomings “could not have been anticipated because they did not exist
while the bill was being written.”5 In both The New Yorker and The New
York Times, news analyses placed responsibility on a confluence of
factors—the fact that “liberal [legal] academics” thought the constitutional
issue a nonstarter, the failure of the Republican lawmakers and media
outlets to question the bill’s constitutionality, and the related failure of
media outlets to run stories about potential legal challenges to the statute.6
In earlier writings that have appeared in the Northwestern University
Law Review and Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy,7 I have
argued that party polarization contributes to congressional disinterest in the
Constitution and that the ACA is a classic case study of the pernicious
effects of polarization on congressional interest in constitutional questions.
In the pages that follow, I will recap and extend that argument. Specifically,
after discussing party polarization’s impact on constitutional deliberations
and the corresponding failure of Congress to take the Constitution seriously
when enacting the ACA, I will consider alternative explanations for
Congress’s failure to take the Constitution into account when enacting the
legislation. I will embrace two supplemental explanations—Congress’s
general disinterest in “public goods” like constitutional interpretation and
the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress.8 I will also examine
and call into question a third supplemental explanation, namely, that
Congress lacked the time to take the Constitution into account. I will argue
instead that Congress was on notice of potential constitutional challenges to
the bill, but that there was insufficient popular or interest group pressure to
galvanize otherwise uninterested lawmakers into action.
Following this assessment, I will close this Essay by shifting from the
positive to the normative. In particular, I will consider the sensibility of the

4

Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed., The Liberal Legal Meltdown over ObamaCare, WALL ST. J.,
May 25, 2012, at A13.
5
Andrew Koppelman, Origins of a Healthcare Lie, SALON (May 31, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.
salon.com/2012/05/31/origins_of_a_healthcare_lie/.
6
Peter Baker, Supporters Slow to Grasp Health Law’s Legal Risks, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at 1
(late edition); see Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/120625fa_fact_klein.
7
Devins, supra note 2; Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution When
Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261 (2012).
8
The public good argument (which I shall embrace and expand upon) is advanced by Elizabeth
Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001).
For scholarship discussing Congress’s tendency to undervalue federalism (and the related absence of a
federalism constituency), see Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
131 (2004), and John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89 (2004).
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Supreme Court’s policing of Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause
power.9 In NFIB, for example, the Court ruled that Congress cannot compel
individuals to participate in the health care or any other market. In assessing
the appropriateness of the Court constraining Congress in this way, I will
argue that, similarly, Congress cannot be expected to self-police itself on
federalism and that as a consequence, it is up to the Court to establish
boundaries on federalism-related matters.10
I. PARTY POLARIZATION AND THE ACA
In this Part, I will make two points about party polarization. First, party
polarization contributes to declining congressional interest in constitutional
questions. Second, its existence helps explain Congress’s failure to think
about the Constitution when enacting the ACA. In making the first point, I
will focus on congressional committee consideration of constitutional
questions. In extending the polarization point to the ACA, I will consider
hearings, committee reports, and legislative debates.
A. Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of
Constitutional Questions
Congressional hearings and, more generally, the work of congressional
committees provide an important lens for understanding lawmaker interest
in constitutional questions.11 Congressional committees, along with political
parties, are one of the two “principal organizing structures of Congress.”12
Hearings, moreover, are a relatively accessible source of information about
Congress. Unlike informal contacts among staffers, members, lobbyists,
and agency officials, hearings are public events.
With respect to constitutional questions, congressional practices
changed dramatically between 1970 and 2010.13 Although committees
routinely considered constitutional questions for the first twenty years of
that period, starting around 1990—and especially following the 1995
Republican takeover of Congress—there was a notable decline in the

9

NFIB also imposed limits on Congress’s spending power, holding that the conditioning of all
federal Medicaid dollars on state participation in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion program was unduly
coercive and therefore unconstitutional. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Because the focus of my ACA case study is on the Commerce Clause, I will provide only limited
discussion of the Spending Clause issue.
10
At the same time, I will express my personal disapproval of the Court’s embrace of the action–
inaction distinction in NFIB.
11
See Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 87, 87–88 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
12
John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009).
13
See Devins, supra note 2, at 741–53, for a detailed presentation of the data summarized in this
paragraph.
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number of constitutional hearings. Indeed, while there were more than sixty
constitutional hearings each year for most years between 1970 and 1985,
there were fewer than forty constitutional hearings most years between
1995 and 2010.14 During that same period, moreover, the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees became the only committees to regularly conduct
constitutional hearings. This meant that the Judiciary Committees held 72%
of constitutional hearings between 1995 and 2010, compared to 46% during
the 1970s.15
In making sense of these two trends, I think it is sensible to pay
attention to the most obvious and recognizable development in Congress
over the past forty years—the ever-growing polarization between the
Democratic and Republican parties.16 The Congress that enacted the ACA
was much different than the Congress of 1970. In 1970, with a strong
contingent of conservative Southern Democrats, Democrats occupied every
ideological niche. Likewise, there were several liberal “Rockefeller
Republicans.” Indeed, throughout the 1970s, there was no meaningful gap
in the median liberal–conservative scores of the two parties. George
Wallace thus justified his 1968 run for president by arguing that there was
not “a dime’s worth of difference” between the two parties.17
Today, however, the forces that pushed Democrats and Republicans
toward the center have given way to an era of ideological polarization.
After Ronald Reagan’s presidential victory in 1980, the moderate-to-liberal
wing of the Republican Party began to disappear. “Ronald Reagan’s GOP”
pursued a conservative agenda that simultaneously isolated the liberal wing
of the Republican Party and appealed to right-leaning Southern Democrats,
many of whom switched allegiance to the increasingly conservative
Republican Party. Computer-driven redistricting further exacerbated
emerging polarization by drawing district lines that essentially guaranteed
each party would win particular seats in the House of Representatives. As a
result, Democratic and Republican candidates sought to mobilize the more
14

From 1985 to 1990, there was no overall decline. The sustained decline (reflecting growing
polarization in Congress) began around 1990. See id. at 743 fig.1.
15
Id. at 750. From 1980 to 1994, Judiciary Committees held 56% of all constitutional hearings.
Specifically, from 1985 to 1992, the Judiciary Committees held less than 50% of constitutional hearings,
and the spike associated with the modern era began around 1992 (again reflecting growing polarization
in Congress). See id.
16
For an excellent treatment of party polarization in Congress since the early 1970s, see generally
SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008). In linking party polarization to
changes in congressional constitutional hearing practices, I do not mean to suggest that party
polarization is the only salient variable in the number and location of hearings. As I explain in Devins,
supra note 2, at 768–75, changes in the national policy agenda, changes in party leadership, court
decisionmaking, and presidential action all impact congressional practices—so there is year-to-year
variability in congressional practices. At the same time, party polarization explains the general decline in
constitutional hearings and the related rise of the Judiciary Committees as the only committees to
regularly hold constitutional hearings.
17
Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at A1.
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partisan bases that vote in party primaries, which pushed out moderates and
rewarded candidates who were both more ideological and more loyal to
their party. By 1990, Congress was transformed; a sharp, ever-growing
divide between the parties replaced the equally sharp gap between Northern
and Southern members of each party. This divide grew throughout the
1990s and 2000s. By 2009—and continuing through today—the ideological
distance between the two parties was greater than at any time since
Reconstruction.18
Party polarization, moreover, has resulted in a basic shift of power
away from congressional committees and toward party leaders. “As the
views of members within [each] party become more alike, the costs of
delegating agenda power” to leadership diminishes.19 Leadership, for
example, exercises greater control over the agenda and jurisdiction of
committees. Leadership has also slashed committee staff and engaged in
other reforms that have diminished committee influence.20 Leadership has
also strengthened its own hand by engaging in message politics—party
efforts to use the legislative process to make symbolic statements to voters
and other constituents.21
The interface of these factors largely explains the decline in
constitutional hearings.22 With fewer staff resources and increasing
intraparty agreement, lawmakers (outside of the Judiciary Committees) are
likely to focus on policy issues that reinforce their party’s message and shy
away from constitutional questions that cast doubt on the legality of their
handiwork. More generally, lawmakers now have incentives to discount
constitutional interpretation in favor of other pursuits—reelection,
advancement within the party, and constituent service. By way of contrast,
Congress was more apt to hold constitutional hearings in the less polarized
1960s and 1970s. There was less pressure to pursue a party-defined
message, and substantially bigger staffs gave committees the resources to
consider a broader range of issues in hearings. Furthermore, committee
18

Party polarization refers to the ideological distance between the average Democratic and
Republican lawmakers based on roll call voting in the House and Senate. In calculating party averages,
roll call votes are registered as liberal, conservative, or moderate. See Party Polarization: 1879–2010,
POLARIZED AM. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://polarizedamerica.com/Polarized_America.htm#POLITICAL
POLARIZATION.
19
David W. Rohde et al., Parties, Committees, and Pivots: A Reassessment of the Literature on
Congressional Organization 12 (Aug. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern
University Law Review). For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 2, at 756–59.
20
For an inventory of institutional reforms that have shifted power away from committees and to
party leaders, see Devins, supra note 2, at 757–58.
21
See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
22
The issues explored in this and the next paragraphs are drawn from Devins, supra note 2, at 759–
68. See also id. at 768–75 (noting that notwithstanding the general decline in constitutional hearings,
there are occasional spike-up years typically tied to presidential initiatives, court decisions, and changes
in party control of Congress).
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chairs needed to reach out to minority party members to form coalitions,
recognizing the fact that some members of their own party disagreed with
their policy priorities, creating a greater incentive to pursue hearings in a
bipartisan way and resulting in committees that were more likely to
consider the constitutional foundations of legislation.
To make these points more concrete, consider the relationship between
the majority and minority parties in defining the content of congressional
hearings. In today’s polarized Congress, Democrats and Republicans vote
along party lines, pursue different agendas, and seek to advance their own
messages while undermining those of the opposing party. For this reason,
the majority party is increasingly unwilling to allow opposition lawmakers
to challenge the constitutionality of legislative proposals. While legislative
majorities have always controlled the policies and agendas of committee
hearings, party polarization has nevertheless resulted in further limiting
minority access to hearings. In part, the majority party’s increasing
homogeneity squelches competing views and thus makes hearings more
one-sided. Committee chairs can count on party loyalists to stick together,
and consequently, there is less reason to reach out to majority or minority
party members who do not necessarily agree with the chair’s agenda. In all,
with party leaders exercising greater control over the agenda and
membership of committees, committee chairs have both less interest in and
less freedom to pursue issues that are inconsistent with the interest of party
leaders. Against this backdrop, policy and constitutional objections to
committee initiatives will likely come from the minority party.23 Yet the
majority party may not allow committee hearings to serve as a vehicle for
airing such minority party objections.24
The Judiciary Committees, like other committees, are also polarized
along party lines. Unlike other committees, however, the confluence of
jurisdiction, member preferences, and interest group pressure has resulted in
the Judiciary Committees’ continuing to hold constitutional hearings.25
Moreover, with the general decline in congressional consideration of
constitutional questions, lawmakers increasingly look to the courts as the
last word on constitutional questions.26

23

See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 142–43 (2004).
24
See Devins, supra note 2, at 766–67.
25
Most importantly, the Judiciary Committees cannot treat constitutional issues as second order
largely because they have jurisdiction over civil liberties, constitutional amendments, and federal courts
(not to mention the Senate’s power to confirm federal judges and Justice Department officials).
26
Today’s Congress—as Bruce Peabody found in his study of lawmaker attitudes toward Court–
Congress relations—no longer thinks that the Court should defer to its constitutional judgments. See
Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 127 (2004); see also Devins, supra
note 2, at 763–64. For additional discussion, see infra note 72.
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In summary, congressional committees increasingly use hearings to
advance the partisan goals of the majority party.27 With more intraparty
agreement and fewer staff resources, committees generally focus on policy
concerns and pay scant attention to the constitutional foundations of
legislation. Correspondingly, the minority party is both more likely to raise
constitutional objections to legislation and less likely to have access to these
hearings. Outside of the Judiciary Committees, which continue to hold
constitutional hearings, minority party members are most likely to express
constitutional concerns through floor statements published in the
Congressional Record and outreach efforts such as press releases and other
public statements.
B. Congress, the Constitution, and the Affordable Care Act
For reasons I will now detail, the enactment of the ACA tracks general
trends in Congress. Congress failed to take account of the Constitution
when enacting the ACA. Indeed, the final version of the bill makes no
reference to any of the constitutional provisions that potentially empowered
Congress to enact the ACA—the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, or Congress’s taxing power.28 Democratic
leaders did not refer the bill to the Judiciary Committees, and constitutional
issues were not explored in any committee hearings or reports.
Constitutional issues received limited attention in legislative debates, with
some Republican members raising constitutional objections (and some
Democrats responding to those objections). Party polarization may well
have figured into this legislative failure.
To start, the 111th Congress held forty-four hearings about the ACA
between its January 2009 opening and March 2010 enactment of the ACA.
Lawmakers, however, did not hold any hearings to examine the bill’s
constitutionality. Also, although Congress specifically found that the
ACA’s individual mandate “is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce,”29 it did not consider the linkage
27

For discussions of majority party control of hearings (including the tendency of the majority party
to call witnesses to support predefined party messages), see Devins, supra note 2, at 766–67; see also
Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill Van Alstyne’s
Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1542–50 (2005).
28
The statute does include findings that the ACA in general and the individual mandate in particular
“affect[] interstate commerce.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). And while (as Chief Justice
Roberts noted in his opinion upholding the individual mandate) “the constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise,” it is nonetheless
telling that Congress failed to reference the sources of constitutional authority that backed up the statute.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)) (internal quotation mark omitted). For further discussion, see infra note
106.
29
§ 1501, 124 Stat. at 242.
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between the factual record it was assembling and applicable constitutional
standards. Instead, lawmakers seemed largely indifferent to a potential
constitutional challenge to the ACA. Given the political import of the ACA,
the number of policy-related hearings held on the bill, and the advent of the
Tea Party (whose questioning of the ACA’s constitutionality proved
politically salient to the Republican Party),30 the fact that the Constitution
played no meaningful role in congressional committee consideration of the
ACA is striking.
Party polarization figures significantly in this story. First, for reasons
just discussed, party polarization has led to a diminution in congressional
interest in the Constitution. Second, with Republican lawmakers uniformly
opposed to the bill, majority lawmakers worked hard to keep their coalition
together. To accomplish this feat, Democratic leaders focused on policy
priorities; hearings about whether the bill was constitutional likely would
have hurt, not helped, their cause. Specifically, Democratic lawmakers
could not risk any defections among their rank and consequently had
nothing to gain by having bill opponents cast doubt on the constitutional
bona fides of the bill. Correspondingly, recognizing the political costs of
raising taxes, Democratic lawmakers (and the Obama White House)
“absolutely reject[ed]” efforts to characterize the individual mandate as a
tax.31
The battle over the ACA was fiercely partisan.32 No Republican voted
for the final bill in either the House or Senate. As a result, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) needed to craft a proposal that would be
acceptable to all sixty Senate Democrats so that the Democratic majority
could invoke cloture and break Republican efforts to derail the bill through
a filibuster.33 On the House side, Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.)
needed to secure the votes of 218 out of 258 House Democrats. Facing
30

For a discussion of the Tea Party and its attacks on the ACA, see sources cited infra note 90; see
also Zietlow, supra note 2, at 1395–1401.
31
Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A14 (quoting President Obama).
32
For two excellent overviews of the legislative process tied to the enactment of the ACA, see
Health Care Overhaul Makes History for Obama, Democratic Congress, in 2010 CQ ALMANAC 9–3–9–
5 (Jan Austin ed., 66th ed. 2011), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=
cqal10-1278-70363-2371661, and Landmark Health Care Overhaul: A Long, Acrimonious Journey, in
2009 CQ ALMANAC 13–3–13–14 (Jan Austin ed., 65th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Landmark Health Care
Overhaul], available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal09-1183-59550-2251513. All factual
claims in this and the next two paragraphs are supported by these two articles.
33
Indeed, with the election of Republican Scott Brown to fill Edward Kennedy’s Senate seat after
Kennedy’s August 2009 death, Senate Democrats needed to enact the bill before Brown took office so
that Democratic holdover appointment Paul Kirk could vote on the bill. As a result, Reid kept the Senate
in session for twenty-five consecutive days, with the final vote on the bill occurring on Christmas Eve
2009. Equally striking, to keep Nebraska Democrat Ben Nelson in the fold, moreover, Reid needed to
amend the bill so that Nebraska would not have to contribute any state funds to the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion. See infra note 86.
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some resistance from moderates within the party, Pelosi made
compromises, including an agreement to allow pro-life Democrats and
Republicans to vote on an amendment prohibiting the use of federal funds
for abortion services except in cases of rape, incest, and danger to the
woman’s life.
The fact that Reid and Pelosi made such compromises to hold their
base together does not cut against earlier claims about the conformity of
views within each party. While increasing homogeneity within each party is
a hallmark of party polarization, party polarization does not foreclose some
ideological variation within a party. Instead, party polarization speaks to the
general conformity of opinion within each party, the growing ideological
distance between the two parties, and the likelihood that party members will
vote with their leadership and against the other party. No Republican voted
in favor of the ACA; in fact, the party launched a nationwide campaign
against what they derogatively called “Obamacare.” Democrats, on the
other hand, overwhelmingly supported the measure and backed party
leaders. Indeed, in the Senate, where all Democrats were needed to resist a
Republican filibuster effort, the party voted as a unified block.
The diminished status of congressional committees in the enactment of
the ACA also supports earlier claims about the linkage between party
polarization and the ascendancy of party leaders at the expense of
committee chairs. Pelosi deployed three House committees to work on the
bill: Energy and Commerce, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means. In
the Senate, Reid turned to the Finance Committee and the Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. Reid and Pelosi then
“assembled their bills from the measures reported by their respective
committees, selecting from among conflicting provisions and tweaking
them again and again to corral voters.”34 With respect to constitutional
issues, it is telling that neither the House nor Senate Judiciary Committees
played any formal role. Instead, policy-oriented committees—most notably,
committees with jurisdiction over health and finance—pursued the bill.
To make the connections between my earlier discussion of polarization
and the ACA case study more explicit, I will now turn to the hearings,
committee reports, and legislative debates that culminated in the enactment
of the bill. As I will show, congressional committees paid virtually no
34

Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 32. No doubt, party leaders in less polarized
Congresses have also tweaked legislation in order to cobble together a majority. At the same time, the
fact that neither Reid nor Pelosi could reach out to Republican members is a hallmark of party
polarization. When Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, Democratic leadership
worked together with Republican leadership, knowing that Southern Democrats stood together to block
the legislation. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 132–49 (1990). Likewise, congressional committees were more likely
to consider the factual suppositions of legislation when Congress was less polarized, including the
question of whether Congress’s commerce power supported the enactment of legislation. See id. at 87–
95.
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attention to constitutional questions in hearings or committee reports. While
there were occasional comments about the Constitution in legislative
debates, these comments highlight the fact that minority members were not
allowed to air constitutional grievances in the committee process. In other
words, the ACA case study backs up the claim that party polarization
contributes to Congress’s declining interest in the Constitution. Republican
lawmakers’ unified opposition to the ACA highlights polarization in
Congress and explains why majority leadership needed to resist all efforts
to derail the bill, including the need to limit opportunities for minority
lawmakers to challenge the bill on constitutional grounds.
Twenty-two hearings tied to health care legislation were held in each
chamber of Congress between January 20, 2009, and March 25, 2010,
though none meaningfully considered the constitutionality of the ACA.35 On
the Senate side, the constitutionality of the statute was raised in only one
hearing.36 In that hearing, held in May 2009 by the Senate Finance
Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) asked witness James Klein,
President of the American Benefits Council, whether geographic variations
in tax rates based on state of residence would be constitutional. Klein said
that he did not know, but another witness—Edward Kleinbard, Chief of
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation—said that he thought Congress
could constitutionally permit regional variations in tax rates.37 Kleinbard’s
constitutional analysis was not part of a prepared statement and takes up
nine sentences in the hearing record.
House hearings tell an identical tale. No witness testimony focused on
constitutional questions, and only one witness answered a member question
about the constitutionality of the ACA. In a September 2009 hearing before
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) asked Michael Cannon,
Director of Health Policy at the Cato Institute, whether the Constitution’s

35

My research assistant Brian Kelley prepared a memo listing each of these hearings, including an
analysis of Congress’s pursuit of constitutional issues in these hearings. His findings are summarized in
Memorandum from Brian Kelley, Research Assistant, to author 22–29 (Aug. 4, 2011) (on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review).
36
Roundtable Discussions on Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussions]. Outside of hearings on health care
legislation, the only other reference in Senate hearings to the constitutionality of the ACA was a
questionnaire submitted by Senator Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) to Health and Human Services nominee
Kathleen Sebelius on whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact the individual mandate. In
her written response, Sebelius expressed support for the bill without addressing the constitutional
question. See Nomination of Governor Kathleen Sebelius: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 92 (2009).
37
Roundtable Discussions, supra note 36, at 137 (statement of Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff,
Joint Comm. on Taxation).
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General Welfare Clause supported the enactment of the ACA. Cannon’s
equivocal response takes up just seven sentences in the hearing record.38
That Congress did not explicitly consider the ACA’s constitutionality
is only part of the story. Lawmakers also did not use the hearings as a
vehicle to meaningfully engage in fact-finding that would strengthen claims
that (1) the ACA regulates economic activity pursuant to Congress’s
Commerce Clause power or (2) the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was
noncoercive.39 Lawmakers likewise made no effort to link committee factfinding to Supreme Court decisionmaking. Moreover, while the evidence is
more ambiguous, there is very little evidence in the hearing record that
suggests lawmakers were interested in establishing a factual predicate for
the idea of a national health insurance marketplace in which all groups and
individuals must participate. Lawmakers, instead, were concerned almost
exclusively with the technical provisions of the bill and how those would
affect health care going forward.
In examining congressional fact-finding, my research assistant Sam
Mann and I looked at hearings in the 110th Congress (after Democrats took
majority control of Congress in 2007 and held thirty hearings related to
possible reforms of the health care system) and in the 111th Congress (from
January 2009, when Obama took office, to March 2010, when Congress
enacted the ACA).40 As noted above, no hearing explicitly referenced
constitutional standards or specifically sought to demonstrate that all
individuals—whether or not they purchase health insurance—are part of the
national health insurance marketplace.41 Eleven hearings did, however,
address the national marketplace, and we focused our attention there. Of the

38

Between You and Your Doctor: The Bureaucracy of Private Health Insurance—Day 1: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong.
139–40 (2009) (statement of Michael F. Cannon, Director of Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute).
39
On the question of whether the Act’s Medicaid extension was noncoercive, a search of hearings
and reports connected with Pub. L. No. 111-148 for [coer!] in ProQuest Congressional did not return
any results relating to the ACA’s Medicaid provisions being coercive; the only mentions of coercion had
to do with coercion of seniors by caretakers and aggressive marketers for Private Fee for Service (PFFS)
plans.
40
Sixty individual hearings were examined. (The transcripts of some hearings were not available on
any of the major databases.) In other words, while our research is fairly comprehensive, there may be
some limitations resulting from data availability. The research is summarized in Memorandum from
Sam Mann, Research Assistant, to author (Nov. 2011) (on file with the Northwestern University Law
Review). All factual assertions in this paragraph are drawn from this memo.
41
One witness alluded to the Constitution when discussing the feasibility of a plan that included the
individual mandate. Dr. James Mongan, in testimony discussing Massachusetts’s experience with an
individual mandate program, said the individual mandate was “tricky” business because “there are some
on the right who attack it because they do not even want to mandate motorcycle helmets, let alone
premium payments.” Charting a Course for Health Care Reform: Moving Toward Universal Coverage:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 30 (2007) (testimony of James J. Mongan, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Partners HealthCare).
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eleven, seven were held in the 110th Congress and four in the 111th
Congress.
The overall focus of all of these hearings was the need for Congress to
reform health care. On the questions surrounding the national marketplace
for insurance, there was very little direct fact-finding. Lawmakers were
primarily concerned with issues such as Medicare, expanding coverage,
achieving the support of insurers, and eliminating waste in the system.42 In
these eleven hearings that touched on the national marketplace, the
committee members and witnesses often referred to subjects that could have
proven relevant to constitutional litigation over the ACA—including
expanding participation pools, the notion of voluntary markets, the need for
universal care, and the economic benefits that a new nationwide system
could provide.
There is some testimony regarding problems with the existing system
of state regulation, such that establishing a national health insurance
marketplace would benefit the health care system as a whole.43 There is also
testimony regarding the effect of decisions to opt out of the national market,
usually made by the young and healthy, which leave the old and infirm still
in the market with higher premiums.44 However, there is no testimony
regarding the connection between mandatory participation and a national
market. In other words, there are only bits and pieces in these congressional
hearings that address the need for a national health insurance marketplace in
which the young and healthy cannot opt out. There is, however, no
systematic effort to explore this question or, more generally, to consider
whether those who opt out of health insurance nevertheless remain players
in the national health care marketplace. Congress’s failure to formally
consider these matters—and, in so doing, shore up the ACA’s constitutional

42

This is to be expected, given the power of the health insurers lobby and other economic interests
impacted by the ACA. At the same time, Congress’s failure to consider at all the Act’s constitutional
underpinnings is striking and highly suggestive of congressional disinterest in the Constitution. In
particular, lawmakers could have asked witnesses to testify about the impact of the uninsured on the
national health care marketplace. This testimony could have been useful to Department of Justice
lawyers defending the statute. Moreover, there is no reason to think that calling such witnesses would
come at a cost to majority lawmakers. Even if minority lawmakers questioned their analyses, these
witnesses—so long as their fact-finding was methodologically sound—should have been able to respond
to such questioning.
43
See America’s Need for Health Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 34, 49 (2008) (statement of Stephen T. Parente,
Director, Medical Industry Leadership Institute, and Associate Professor of Finance, Carlson School of
Management).
44
See Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal and State
Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (statement of Steven Goldman, Comm’r, New Jersey
Department of Banking and Insurance); Roundtable Discussions, supra note 36, at 542 (statement of
Scott Serota, President and Chief Executive Officer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association).
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foundation—suggests that constitutional issues did not register with
lawmakers and their staff.45
Congressional committee reports similarly suggest that lawmakers paid
scant attention to the Constitution when enacting the ACA. Not one of the
twenty reports issued by the 110th and 111th Congresses formally
addresses the constitutionality of the statute.46 None of the four Senate
Reports make any reference to the Constitution. In the House, institutional
rules require “[a] statement citing the specific powers granted to Congress
in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill.”47 Notwithstanding
this requirement, eleven of sixteen House Reports make no reference to the
Constitution. Of the five that do reference the Constitution, none does more
than merely cite the House Rule and reference constitutional provisions that
support enactment without substantive discussion.48
Furthermore, committee reports show very little congressional factfinding overall, and they show no effort to link fact-finding to constitutional
standards.49 Of the seven reports issued by the 111th Congress, most
mention economic research on the need for health care reform. One of the
seven discusses the linkage between the costs of the uninsured and the
national marketplace. That report, by the Senate Finance Committee, cites
“[c]ountless studies” about the economic ramifications of the uninsured—
that “23 percent [of uninsured adults] forgo necessary care every year due
to cost” and that the cost for those that do seek care is shifted to the
insured.50
What is striking here is that the ACA is the signature bill of the 111th
Congress—a bill that Democrats pushed once taking over Congress in
2007, a bill that builds upon the failed efforts of the Clinton Administration
45

Moreover, there is no reason to think this failure was at all calculated as an effort to steer clear of
a politically volatile issue. For reasons noted supra note 42, majority lawmakers could have pursued this
question with little or no political risk.
46
Committee reports were identified through two separate searches, a LexisNexis Search and a
Lexis/ProQuest Congressional search. Some reports were listed in one search but not the other, and the
analysis in this paragraph considers all potentially relevant reports, even if one or the other search did
not list a particular report. In other words, if anything, I overstate congressional committee references to
the Constitution. For additional discussion from which this paragraph is drawn, see E-mail from
Frederick W. Dingledy, Reference Librarian, to author (Dec. 12, 2011, 4:55 PM) (on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review), and Kelley, supra note 35.
47
JOHN V. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 110162, at 626 (2009) (House Rule XIII, cl. 3(d)(1)).
48
All five reference the Commerce Clause, three reference the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
two reference Congress’s taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment.
49
Information in this paragraph is drawn from Mann, supra note 40.
50
S. COMM. ON FIN., AMERICA’S HEALTHY FUTURE ACT OF 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 2 (2009).
In the same report, the Senate Finance Committee references the “hidden health tax,” where health
premiums are increased in order to mitigate the “estimated $56 billion annually in uncompensated care
to people without health insurance.” Id.
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to transform health care in the 1990s, and a bill that “congressional
Democrats and President Obama stake[d] their political fortunes on the
outcome.”51 Against this backdrop, the failure of congressional committees
to either consider the bill’s constitutionality or to formally engage in factfinding designed to shore up the bill’s constitutional foundation is stunning.
At the same time, this failure is not surprising. The ACA exemplifies the
ways that party polarization undermines congressional interest in the
Constitution. The confluence of growing committee disinterest in the
Constitution and the political necessity of holding the majority coalition
together proved to be a perfect storm of the costs and consequences of party
polarization.
Congressional debates over the ACA reinforce this conclusion. With
no opportunity to use the committee process to attack the ACA’s
constitutional foundation, minority lawmakers turned to the floor of
Congress to air their grievances. At the same time, declining lawmaker
interest in the Constitution meant that policy—not constitutional—concerns
were the overwhelming focus of ACA legislative debates. Furthermore, to
the extent that minority lawmakers invoke the Constitution, they do so to
derail legislative initiatives that they oppose on policy grounds. These very
same lawmakers conveniently ignore the Constitution when their party is in
the majority.52
These debates over the health care legislation spanned 25 days and
totaled 790 pages.53 Twenty-five entries explicitly discussed the
constitutionality of the statute.54 Sixteen of these entries take up
substantially less than one page in the Congressional Record. Of the nine
entries that take up more than one page, seven contain articles that were
submitted to the Congressional Record. None of the twenty-five entries
discussed congressional fact-finding.55
Perhaps more telling, to the extent that lawmakers considered the
Constitution at all, they essentially ignored two of the three constitutional
issues eventually examined by the Supreme Court in NFIB. Lawmakers did
not meaningfully discuss either Congress’s efforts to use its Spending
Clause power to expand Medicaid or whether the taxing power provided an
alternative source of authority for the ACA’s individual mandate. On the
question of Congress’s Spending Clause power to expand Medicaid, two
51

Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 32.
See Devins, supra note 2, at 746–47 (noting a decline in constitutional hearings irrespective of
which party is in the majority); id. at 766–67 (noting that, in today’s polarized Congress, constitutional
objections to the majority party’s legislative initiatives are made by minority party lawmakers).
53
Information in this paragraph is drawn from Kelley, supra note 35; Mann, supra note 40.
54
Entries refer to headings in the Congressional Record. Most entries feature comments by only
one member, but some entries feature statements by several members.
55
Separate searches for the terms “marketplace,” “unavoidable,” and “voluntary” only turned up a
handful of lawmaker comments regarding the idea of a national marketplace for health insurance. See
Mann, supra note 40.
52
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Republican lawmakers claimed that the Medicaid expansion was
unconstitutional, but neither provided any analysis to back up that
conclusion.56 Likewise, there was next to no discussion of the taxing power
as an alternative source of authority for the ACA’s individual mandate.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) was the only lawmaker to provide any
analysis of Congress’s taxing power.57
Even though lawmakers spent virtually no time examining
constitutional issues when debating health care legislation, it is nevertheless
true that Republican lawmakers—largely shut out in the committee
process—aired their constitutional grievances on the floor of Congress. Six
House Republicans and four Senate Republicans questioned the bill’s
constitutionality in floor debates.58 The fact that so few Republican
lawmakers spoke to the bill’s constitutionality (as compared to the very
large number who spoke out against the bill in floor debates59) again
highlights the currently polarized Congress’s disinterest in constitutional
issues. Along these lines, it is not surprising that House Republicans
scheduled hearings on the constitutionality of the ACA after the 2011
Republican takeover of the House (around nine months after enactment).60
In part, Republican leadership in the House had incentive to use
constitutional hearings as a mechanism to reinforce claims that theirs is the
party of limited government, thereby criticizing the purported overreaching
of the White House and congressional Democrats. During the 2010 election
cycle, House Republican leadership embraced Tea Party calls for limited
government by explicitly questioning the ACA’s constitutionality and
embracing a proposal requiring every bill to include language citing its
constitutional authority. House Majority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio)
specifically attacked the “constitutionally suspect ‘individual mandate’”
56

See 156 CONG. REC. H1856 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Deal); 155 CONG. REC.
S13,718 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
57
See 155 CONG. REC. S13,751 (daily ed. Dec 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy). In its Supreme
Court brief, the Department of Justice suggested that the taxing power was subject to congressional
debate, noting that “congressional leaders defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power.”
Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 58, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,
No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2010), 2012 WL 37168, at *58. With the exception of Senator Leahy, however,
no member did more than mention the taxing power without meaningful elaboration. See Memorandum
from Amber Shepherd, Research Assistant, to author (July 2, 2012) (on file with the Northwestern
University Law Review).
58
See 156 CONG. REC. H177–83 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2010) (statements of Reps. Garrett, Foxx,
Broun, Gohmert, and Bishop); 155 CONG. REC. S13,821–29 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statements of
Sens. Hutchison, Ensign, Hatch, and Kyl); 155 CONG. REC. H12,429 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement
of Rep. Poe).
59
As noted earlier, legislative debates of the ACA took up 790 pages in the Congressional Record,
nearly all of which focused on policy—not constitutional—issues.
60
The 2011 hearings about the constitutionality of the ACA were also tied to 2010 federal district
court rulings that the ACA was unconstitutional. See infra notes 94–96 (discussing the role of these
federal court rulings in the 2011 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality).
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and, relatedly, argued that a requirement that all bills cite specific
constitutional authority could create a valuable “obstacle to expanded
government.”61 Following the 2010 elections, House Republican leadership
likewise made clear that it intended to continue its campaign to dismantle
health care reform.
Two additional points bear mention in discussing the potential nexus
between Congress’s failure to consider the ACA’s constitutionality and the
Court’s role in placing limits on congressional power (as NFIB placed
limits on the commerce and spending but not the tax power). First, for
reasons I will detail in Part III, Congress’s interest in constitutional
questions should be salient to the scope of judicial review on federalism
issues. This does not mean that the Court was right to place the limits it did
on Congress’s commerce and spending powers; it means that the Court
should take Congress’s predilections into account.62 Second, even if
congressional disinterest in the Constitution prompted the Court to reign in
Congress, the Court should not invalidate legislation because Congress fails
to hold constitutional hearings, fails to engage in constitutional fact-finding,
or fails to meaningfully debate the constitutionality of legislation. There is
no such thing as “due process in lawmaking,” obligating Congress to hold
hearings or anything else. Indeed, legislative action leading up to the
ACA—as well as findings in the ACA itself—highlight the impossibility of
imposing due process demands on Congress.63 Most notably, the bill
contains eight specific findings to support claims that the ACA’s individual
mandate is “commercial and economic” and “substantially affects interstate
commerce.”64
61

See House Republicans Want All Bills to Cite Constitutional Authority, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept.
17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/17/house-republicans-want-bills-cite-constitutional
-authority/ (internal quotation mark omitted). The rise of the Tea Party as a politically powerful
Republican constituency propelled these constitutional arguments and initiatives. See Zietlow, supra
note 2, at 1395–1401.
62
See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
63
See also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988
Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 400–06 (arguing that there is no “due process in
lawmaking”).
64
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). In its briefs defending the ACA, the Department of Justice
points to these legislative findings—as well as roughly eighteen references to the national health
marketplace in hearings, debates, and reports during the 110th and 111th Congresses—to assert that “the
legislative record leave[s] no doubt that [the ACA’s individual mandate] . . . is a valid exercise of the
commerce power.” Brief for Appellants at 25, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461593, at *25. Department of Justice lawyers
deserve great credit for culling the legislative record to make as convincing a case for the ACA as
possible. At the same time, the Government’s brief (which intersperses academic studies along with
legislative record material) is ultimately a “legislative collage” as opposed to legislative history. Its
collection of legislative findings, debate statements, committee hearings, legislative memos, and
academic studies makes the best case possible for the ACA but does not counter, for reasons detailed in
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II. BEYOND POLARIZATION: OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CONGRESS’S
FAILURE TO THINK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION WHEN ENACTING THE ACA
In Part I, I explained how party polarization contributes to a general
decline in lawmaker interest in constitutional questions and,
correspondingly, that Congress’s enactment of the ACA exemplifies this
larger trend. In this Part, I will consider three other factors that may have
contributed to congressional disinterest in the ACA’s constitutionality:
Congress’s general disinterest in public goods like constitutional
interpretation; the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress (so that
there is no interest group pressure pushing lawmakers to consider the
federalism implications of legislation); and the fact that constitutional
objections to the ACA were made late in the legislative process and, as
such, lawmakers did not have time to seriously consider potential
constitutional objections to the ACA. For reasons I will detail in this Part, I
think the public goods and federalism constituency explanations are useful
supplements to my claims about party polarization; I do not, however, think
that timing concerns made it impossible for Congress to think about the
constitutionality of the ACA.
A. Congress and the Constitution
Lawmakers have little incentive to independently interpret the
Constitution. In particular, while all members of Congress have a stake in
preserving Congress’s institutional authority to independently interpret the
Constitution, lawmaker desires to seek reelection, gain status within their
party, and serve interest group constituents overwhelm this “collective
good.”65 In particular, a lawmaker who invests in constitutional
interpretation “loses time for fundraising, casework, media appearances,
and obtaining particularized spending projects in her district; she will thus
be at a disadvantage [when seeking reelection].”66
In explaining why “Congress is designed to pass over constitutional
questions,” former Congressman and D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva
remarked that “the constitutional principles involved in a bill, unlike its
merits, are generally abstract, unpopular, and fail to capture the imagination
of either the media or the public. The Constitution is often portrayed as an
obstacle to a better society by Congressmen forced to confront its
limitations.”67

this Part, the overwhelming evidence that lawmakers were not meaningfully engaged in constitutional
analysis or constitutional fact-finding.
65
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 132, 144 (1999).
66
Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1301.
67
Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 587, 609–10 (1983).
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Academic studies of lawmaker interest in constitutional interpretation
bear this out. Consider, for example, the complementary work of Mitch
Pickerell, Keith Whittington, and Bruce Peabody. Pickerell’s study of
constitutional deliberation in Congress demonstrates that lawmakers
typically advance a positive legislative agenda and, consequently, rarely
have reason to discuss potential constitutional limitations; instead,
lawmakers “first take their position on legislation based on their policy
preferences, and then use all arguments possible to support that position.”68
Whittington likewise calls attention to how it is that lawmakers benefit by
making judgmental statements pleasing to voters and other constituents.69 In
particular, lawmakers “can always take credit for voting the right way on
the issue” and, as such, are unlikely to raise constitutional or other
objections that cut against such “position-taking” behavior.70 Peabody’s
study (surveying lawmakers’ attitudes towards Court–Congress relations)
highlights two related phenomena, namely, (1) the legal issues that matter
to lawmakers concern “local and electorally salient matters” and (2) more
than 70% of lawmaker respondents said the courts should give little or no
weight to congressional judgments about the constitutionality of
legislation.71 In other words, lawmakers care about reelection; they do not
defend their institutional prerogatives to interpret the Constitution but,
instead, defer to the courts.72
Party polarization, for the reasons discussed in Part I, exacerbates
Congress’s general disinclination to engage in constitutional issues.
Majority party leaders do not want to allow the opposition party to raise
constitutional objections to their proposals; committee chairs have fewer
staff to pursue such issues and less interest in reaching across the aisle to
build bipartisan coalitions with the minority party. Correspondingly, with
party members adhering to leadership-defined priorities, there is no reason
to accommodate dissenters within the majority party.
Congress’s failure to consider the constitutionality of the ACA,
undoubtedly, is tied to both polarization and to the fact that constitutional
interpretation is the type of collective good that lawmakers discount in the
pursuit of their preferred policies and reelection. For reasons I will now
detail, the absence of a federalism constituency in Congress also
68

PICKERILL, supra note 23, at 143–44.
Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive,
51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001).
70
Id. at 513. Whittington cites the Violence Against Women Act and the Gun Free School Zone Act
as examples of “position-taking” behavior. See id.
71
Peabody, supra note 26, at 147, 151.
72
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–65 (1999)
(arguing that legislators—knowing that courts will check their errors—have little incentive to enact only
constitutionally permissible statutes); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On
the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 440–47 (2001) (highlighting various ways that
Congress signals to the Supreme Court that it embraces judicial supremacy).
69
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contributed to Congress’s failure to consider the constitutionality of the
ACA.
B. Federalism and the Failure of Interest Group Politics
There is no federalism constituency in Congress. Interest groups and
voters are interested in first-order policy preferences; the question of
whether favored policies are pursued by Congress or the states matters little
to voters and interest groups. Indeed, interest groups have incentive to
pursue nationwide initiatives. Rather than seek reform in fifty different
states, national solutions cement interest group preferences in ways that are
more pervasive and more efficient (national solutions cost less money and
take less time to pursue than state by state reforms).73 Moreover, state and
local interests often benefit from national programs, and consequently,
states and localities do not serve as a bulwark protecting state prerogatives
from Congress’s nationalistic tendencies.74
In previous writings, I have looked at judicial confirmation hearings,
party platforms, interest group web pages, opinion polls, and lawmaker
commentary on Supreme Court federalism decisions to detail how
uninterested today’s Congress and interest groups are in federalism qua
federalism.75 This disinterest tracks historical patterns. In particular, rather
than adhere to a consistent position on federalism, Americans have always
let their views on first-order policy priorities dictate their views on
federalism. Here are a few examples: When fighting over the Louisiana
Purchase, Northern Federalists, who typically advocated for federal power,
and Jeffersonians, who usually supported states’ rights, flipped their normal
positions to pursue favored policies. During the Civil War, abolitionists
(who had earlier opposed fugitive slave laws on states’ rights grounds)
embraced nationalistic solutions and proslavery forces embraced states’
rights arguments. Similarly, before workers could turn to the federal
government during the New Deal, turn-of-the-century progressives “strove
to curb the power of entrenched corporate wealth.”76 More recently,
Republicans who ran on the anti-big-government “Contract with America”
pursued national standards on tort reform, telecommunications reform, and
numerous criminal law initiatives.

73

See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (1998).
74
See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 8.
75
See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1194–1200 (2001); Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus:
Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not the
Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1318–24 (2002); Devins, supra note 8. Examples for the
balance of this paragraph are drawn from id. at 134–37.
76
Eugene D. Genovese, Getting States’ Rights Right, ATLANTIC (March 2001), http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/03/getting-states-rights-right/302133/.
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In addition to the flipping of positions by interest groups and elected
officials, it is sometimes the case that elected officials simply ignore
federalism concerns—as no interest group is pushing Congress to take
federalism into account when enacting legislation. Consider, for example,
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA).77 To start, pro-choice and
pro-life interests sometimes support and other times oppose laws that seek
national solutions to abortion-related issues. For example, pro-choice and
pro-life interests divide over the PBABA and freedom of choice legislation.
That division has nothing to do with federalism, as both measures are
propelled by an expansive view of congressional power. With no obvious
benefit to be derived from embracing a broad or narrow view of
congressional power, pro-choice and pro-life interest groups see federalism
as a second-order issue that is of next to no relevance to them. That is why
lawmakers largely ignored federalism concerns when enacting the PBABA
in 2003—even though lawmakers were on notice that Congress might not
have authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate which medical
procedures women can use to terminate late-term pregnancies.78 Instead,
pro-choice and pro-life lawmakers and interest groups appealed to their
base by engaging in the moral and legal debate about the right to choose,
not the mundane issue of whether the PBABA was an “economic”
regulation.
The ACA seems cut from a similar cloth. No federalism constituency
pushed for federalism-related hearings, and legislative debates focused
almost exclusively on policy, not constitutional, questions.79 No lawmaker
discussed congressional fact-finding when discussing the Act’s
constitutionality; Republican lawmakers’ attacks against the bill focused
almost exclusively on policy concerns, suggesting that these lawmakers saw
little political gain in arguing that the bill was constitutionally flawed.80 And
while party polarization helps explain the absence of congressional hearings
to assess the constitutionality of the ACA, the absence of a federalism
constituency also explains this failure. Likewise, the failure of minority
party lawmakers to use legislative debates to launch a constitutional attack
77

This paragraph is drawn from Neal Devins, How Congress Paved the Way for the Rehnquist
Court’s Federalism Revival: Lessons from the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 21 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 461, 465–68 (2007).
78
Specifically, the federalism issue had been raised in 1995 hearings, in law review articles, and in
opinion pieces published by the Washington Post and the National Review. Nevertheless, with the
exception of Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.), lawmakers did not
consider the law’s federalism implications when enacting it. See id. at 466. The House Committee
Report does include a brief discussion of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, although dissenting
Democrats made no mention of the Commerce Clause in their “dissenting views.” See H.R. REP. NO.
108-58, at 23–26 (2003). Moreover, with the exception of one passing reference to the federalism issue,
committee hearings ignore the Commerce Clause issue. See Devins, supra note 77, at 466–67.
79
See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
80
See supra notes 58–59.
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on the bill seems a function of both congressional disinterest in the
Constitution and the absence of a federalism constituency.
C. Did Congress Have Reason to Think that the Individual Mandate Might
Be Unconstitutional?
Congress’s disinclination to assess the underlying constitutionality of
federalism-related legislation is certainly linked to party polarization, the
lack of a federalism constituency, and Congress’s general disinterest in
public goods like constitutional interpretation. At the same time, lawmakers
are not seers and they should not be expected to anticipate arguments that
do not exist when legislation is crafted. For this very reason, Andrew
Koppelman argues that Congress did not consider constitutional attacks to
the ACA because bill opponents failed to raise serious Commerce Clause
objections in time for lawmakers to take those objections into account.81
Claiming that these objections to the bill were not fully developed until the
fall of 2009, “quite late in the legislative process,” the “constitutional limits
that the bill supposedly disregarded could not have been anticipated
because they did not exist while the bill was being written.”82
This claim is not frivolous. Commerce Clause objections to the bill
were not meaningfully launched until July 2009, and these objections were
not fully developed until late fall 2009 (around the time that Congress was
completing hearings on the ACA).83 At the same time, Congress was
certainly “on notice” in the summer of 2009 that the individual mandate
would be subject to a vigorous constitutional attack. Moreover, Congress’s
failure to engage in constitutional fact-finding was a byproduct of
legislative disinterest, not the failure of Act opponents to launch timely
complaints about the ACA.84 Indeed, for reasons I will now detail,
Congress’s failure was not tied to notice; it was tied, instead, to issue
81

Koppelman, supra note 5.
Id. It is unclear whether Congress was on notice with respect to Spending Clause objections. This
was essentially a nonissue in the press and among academic commentators; moreover, as noted above,
only two lawmakers made any reference to it in legislative debates. See supra note 55. Moreover, the
Supreme Court had never ruled that an exercise of the Spending Clause was unconstitutional because it
was unduly coercive. See Aziz Huq, In the Healthcare Decision, a Hidden Threat?, NATION (June 29,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/168677/healthcare-decision-hidden-threat# (suggesting that
Spending Clause ruling was unprecedented and unexpected). At the same time, the Court had put
Congress on notice that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to . . . [be] unconstitutional.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987); see also
supra notes 39, 56 (noting no congressional fact-finding on the coercion issue); infra note 101
(discussing Court’s Spending Clause ruling).
83
See Koppelman, supra note 5 (contending that “[t]he first sustained legal argument” against the
ACA was published in December 2009).
84
This applies to the Spending Clause as well as the Commerce Clause. For example, Congress
made no effort to find facts that the Medicaid condition was noncoercive. See supra notes 39, 42, 56; see
also supra note 41 (noting that Commerce Clause fact-finding could be pursued at no political cost to
Democrats).
82
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salience. Specifically, it took the launching of constitutional challenges to
the ACA by more than twenty Republican governors and attorneys general
and the invalidation of the statute by two federal district courts to create the
type of issue salience that compelled Congress to hold constitutional
hearings on the statute.85 Before that time, the roadblocks to constitutional
deliberation were sufficiently potent to prevent lawmakers from
meaningfully considering possible constitutional challenges to the statute.
To start, congressional Democrats were strongly disinclined to hold
hearings about the ACA’s constitutionality. In addition to the abovediscussed roadblocks, Democratic leaders could not risk their very fragile
coalition by allowing bill opponents to use constitutional hearings as a
vehicle to slow down momentum for the bill.86 Moreover, by the summer of
2009 (several months before the last hearings on the ACA), congressional
Democrats were on notice that bill opponents would oppose the bill on
constitutional grounds. From July to September 2009, opinion pieces in the
Washington Post and Wall Street Journal and an online debate in Politico
all flagged potential constitutional problems with the ACA.87 These opinion
pieces, among other things, argued that “[t]he federal government does not
have the power to regulate Americans simply because they are there”88 and
that “Congress would have to explain how not doing
something . . . implicated interstate commerce.”89 By the fall of 2009,
congressional Democrats were well aware that the bill would be subject to a
fierce constitutional attack both in the courts and on the campaign trail,

85

See Klein, supra note 6 (noting these and other factors); see also Jack M. Balkin, From off the
Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-themandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ (highlighting the import of unified Republican opposition
to the bill, including the litigation challenge by Republican attorneys general).
86
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing steps that Speaker Pelosi and Majority
Leader Reid took to keep the Democratic coalition intact); see also Chris Frates, Ben Nelson’s Medicaid
Deal, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2009, 9:53 AM), http://www.politico.com/livepulse/1209/Ben_Nelsons_
Medicaid_deal.html (noting that Democratic leaders—in order to keep Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson as
part of their coalition—modified the bill so that the federal government would pay for Nebraska’s
Medicaid costs under the ACA).
87
See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2009) [hereinafter CRS
REPORT]; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Illegal Health Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2009, at
A15; Healthcare: Is “Mandatory Insurance” Unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2009),
http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/healthcare-reform-constitutionality.html; Andrew P. Napolitano,
Health-Care Reform and the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:57 AM), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574412793406386548.html.
88
Rivkin & Casey, supra note 87.
89
Koppelman, supra note 5 (quoting a July 10, 2009 Federalist Society paper by Peter Urbanowicz
and Dennis G. Smith).
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where Republicans (buoyed by Tea Party opposition to the ACA) would
trash the bill as unconstitutional governmental overreaching.90
Against this background, congressional Democrats should have known
of potential constitutional challenges to the Act, including the action–
inaction distinction that proved central to the Commerce Clause ruling in
NFIB.91 At the same time, these constitutional arguments—while politically
strong—were not sufficiently salient to compel an otherwise reluctant
Congress to hold constitutional hearings or meaningfully debate the Act’s
constitutionality. Instead, reflecting Congress’s general disinterest in
constitutional questions, Democratic lawmakers made no efforts to use
existing hearings to find facts that would strengthen the Act’s constitutional
foundations.92 Lawmakers, moreover, made no formal reference in the ACA
to the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Spending
Clause, or Congress’s taxing power. Even more striking, Republican
lawmakers launched only a half-hearted attempt to cast doubt on the ACA’s
constitutionality; they focused, instead, on the policy issues that seemed
politically salient at the time.93
By February 2011 (almost one year after enactment of the ACA), the
bill’s constitutionality was sufficiently salient to prompt House and Senate
hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality.94 By this time, there was great
90

For a discussion of Tea Party opposition to the bill, see John Fritze et al., The Health Care Bill’s
8 Key Moments, USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2010-03-25-health-care-moments_N.htm. For a discussion of Tea Party efforts to link their opposition to
the ACA and other governmental programs with their vision of constitutional federalism, see Ilya
Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300
(2011); Zietlow, supra note 2, at 1367–68, 1395–97; Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution
and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/
2011/01/17/110117crat_atlarge_lepore; and Adam J. White, The Tea Party’s Constitution, WKLY.
STANDARD (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/tea-party-s-constitution_590449.
html.
91
Some have argued that congressional Democrats should have known about this argument before
proposing the individual mandate. Specifically, when the Clinton White House proposed a requirement
that all businesses provide health insurance, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by David Rivkin
and Lee Casey arguing that such a mandate impermissibly forced people who were doing nothing to act.
See James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1
(late edition). At the same time, I do not think Congress should be expected to know about arguments
that were made sixteen years earlier.
92
See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
93
See supra notes 58–59.
94
In addition to the two hearings explicitly about the constitutionality of the ACA, there were
mentions of the ACA’s constitutionality in twenty other hearings from March 26, 2010, to December 31,
2011. This number was based on a search of the LEXIS CQ Transcription database and the Federal
News Service database. See Dingledy, supra note 46. During this same period, a search of the
Congressional Record resulted in 220 hits. The search was: “(affordable care act and (constitution! Or
unconstitution!) and section (house or senate and not digest)).” For additional discussion of the specific
questions asked in hearings and statements made on the floor of Congress, see Memorandum from Brian
Kelley, Research Assistant, to author (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with the Northwestern University Law
Review). Finally, Democratic leadership (in both the House and Senate, including leaders of committees
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interest in Congress and throughout the country in the constitutionality of
the Act—thanks to the confluence of federal court rulings against the ACA,
the Tea Party fueled Republican takeover of the House, the efforts of
Republican party officials to challenge the ACA in court, and the media
attention attendant to all these developments.95 Furthermore, since the ACA
was law, there was little reason (in the still-Democratic controlled Senate)
for party leaders to resist such hearings.96
*

*

*

Congress’s failure to think about the Constitution when enacting the
ACA is hardly surprising. For reasons detailed in the first two Parts of this
Essay, this failure is a byproduct of party polarization, the absence of a
federalism constituency in Congress, and Congress’s disinclination to
pursue collective goods like constitutional interpretation. Indeed, even
though Congress was on notice of potential constitutional challenges to the
ACA, the constitutional issue was of little salience to either Democratic or
Republican lawmakers at the time of the ACA’s enactment (as revealed in
the failure of legislative debates to seriously consider the constitutional
question). Instead, it was outside-the-D.C.-beltway forces that transformed
the ACA’s constitutionality into a politically salient issue, namely, the
efforts of Republican governors and attorneys general who challenged the
ACA, the Tea Party and its contribution to the 2010 Republican takeover of
the House, and the two federal district courts that found the ACA
unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM97
The question remains: What does my case study of the ACA suggest
about the Court’s role in reviewing congressional decisionmaking on
federalism issues? In this concluding Part, I will address this issue—
suggesting that the judiciary is the only branch of government that will
police federalism. And while I personally disagree with the five Justices
who thought that the Commerce Clause did not back up the ACA, I do think
it is the Supreme Court’s responsibility to impose some boundary-control
of relevant jurisdiction) and more than one hundred Republicans joined one or more of several amicus
briefs on the constitutionality of the ACA before the federal courts of appeal. See id.
95
See Balkin, supra note 85; Klein, supra note 6.
96
There is good reason to think that House and Senate Judiciary Committee members wanted to
hold hearings on the ACA’s constitutionality, for these committees are dominated by policy-oriented
lawyers personally interested in constitutional questions. Devins, supra note 2, at 778–79. On the House
side, the Republican takeover of the House also fueled such hearings (so that the Republican party could
beat its drum regarding the constitutionality of the ACA). See supra notes 60–61.
97
The title of this Part is drawn from Devins, supra note 8. The second paragraph of this Part is
drawn from id. at 136–37.
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limits on Congress. Indeed, against the backdrop of congressional
inattention to the Constitution, including constitutional fact-finding, it is
hard to find fault with the five Justices who wanted to slap Congress (even
if another form of boundary control might have been preferable).98
Congress, as suggested in Part II, cannot police itself on federalismrelated issues. Voters, interest groups, and political parties look to
democratic outlets to pursue favored policy initiatives. And since the firstorder policy priorities of interest groups are sometimes served by judicial
standards that facilitate Congress’s expansionist tendencies, there is no
interest group that will push for a narrowing construction of Congress’s
commerce power.99 In other words, unless judicial interpretations foreclose
the pursuit of first-order policy priorities, it is unlikely that lawmakers will
formally and consistently embrace a broad theory of federalism.
How then should the Court police Congress’s exercise of its commerce
power? One approach is to rely on fact-dependent standards; another is to
place limits on Congress through boundary-control rules that would deem
some federalism-related issues to be questions of law, not fact.100 For
reasons I have detailed elsewhere, I think fact-dependent standards do not
operate as meaningful constraints on Congress’s commerce power. With no
federalism constituency in Congress, there is little reason to think that
Congress will take fact-finding seriously, and courts are ill equipped to
second-guess Congress’s findings.101
In NFIB, five of the Justices made use of a boundary-control rule to
limit Congress’s commerce power.102 Concluding that the mandate “directs
98

For additional discussion, see infra notes 105–06.
See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 8; Whittington, supra note 69, at 509–18.
100
An example of a fact-dependent standard is the “affecting commerce” standard that the Court
deployed in the 1937 decision, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6 (1937). An
example of a boundary-control rule is the requirement that Congress’s commerce power is limited to
economic activity, that is, “the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce.”
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
101
See Devins, supra note 75, at 1198–1200. It is less certain whether Congress could insulate
factual assertions about whether conditions on federal spending are coercive. For the Commerce Clause,
questions about whether activities, for example, do “affect interstate commerce” seem nationwide in
scope and, as such, best answered by the national legislature. On the other hand, questions about
coercion are arguably best answered by the states subject to the choice of whether to accept or forego
conditions on federal funds.
102
See James B. Stewart, An Important New Limit on the Commerce Clause, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2012, 2:16 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/an-important-new-limit-on-thecommerce-clause/. For a variety of reasons, there is some question as to whether the opinions of these
five Justices constitute a binding precedent on Congress’s commerce power. See Walter Dellinger,
Supreme Court Year in Review—Entry 15: Why This Is Now Chief Justice Roberts’ Court, SLATE (June
28, 2012, 1:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/
2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review/supreme_court_upholds_obamacare_why_this_is_now_roberts_c
ourt_.html (noting that there was no opinion in which five Justices joined); William A. Jacobson, What
If That Huge Conservative Doctrinal Achievement Was Mere Dicta?, LEGAL INSURRECTION (June 29,
2012, 4:36 PM), http://legalinsurrection.com/2012/06/what-if-that-huge-conservative-doctrinal99
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the creation of commerce” and that “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing
nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional
authority,”103 these Justices embraced the action–inaction distinction
advanced by critics of the law. Through this boundary control, Congress
could regulate but not create commerce.
That the Court would want to create some type of boundary control in
the ACA case seems sensible. Congress made no effort to find facts
showing that the uninsured participate in the national health marketplace.104
Likewise, there are no findings that the individual mandate is “necessary
and proper” to a well-functioning national health insurance system.105
Finally, the bill does not even reference the Necessary and Proper Clause or
Congress’s powers over commerce, spending, and taxation.106 Given the
import of the bill, the uniqueness of the mandate, and the fact that Congress
had reason to know that the bill would be subject to a serious constitutional
challenge, Congress’s failure to think about the Constitution seems
especially egregious.
None of this is to say that the Court needed to draw a boundary in the
ACA case or that the boundary it drew was correct.107 At the same time,
achievement-was-mere-dicta/ (noting that the Commerce Clause holding was not essential to Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion).
103
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 2587 (majority opinion).
104
See sources cited supra note 44.
105
This type of finding would correspond to Justice Scalia’s invocation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in a 2005 ruling upholding a federal ban on medical marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion of the link between Justice Scalia’s Raich
concurrence and the ACA, see CRS REPORT, supra note 87, at 8 & n.41.
106
Congress, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his opinion, is under no formal obligation to cite
these powers. See supra note 28. At the same time, it cannot help a bill’s chances when its defenders—
academic amici and the Department of Justice—must invest substantial effort in explaining why, for
example, “[t]he Taxation Clause does not require Congress to use any particular labels or expressly
invoke the taxation power.” Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellant at 16, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-11021), 2011 WL 1461597, at *16.
107
I think both that the uninsured participate in the national health marketplace and that it is
“necessary and proper” to impose costs on the uninsured as part of a national regulatory insurance
scheme that requires insurance companies to provide coverage to individuals with preexisting
conditions. From my vantage, the constitutional objection to the individual mandate is much more about
the liberty interest “not to participate” than about the Commerce Clause. For this very reason, I signed a
brief supporting the individual mandate as an exercise of Congress’s commerce power. See Brief of Law
Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and
Reversal on the Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,
No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 160237. Moreover, the Court could have imposed a
somewhat different boundary on the Commerce Clause—allowing Congress to create incentives to
participate in one or another market but rejecting the idea that Congress could compel mandatory
participation. This suggestion was advanced by Walter Dellinger as a way for the Court to place limits
on Congress while upholding the mandate under the commerce power. See Walter Dellinger, Supreme
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Congress’s failures are striking and the Court’s efforts to limit Congress
understandable. Sadly, for reasons detailed in Parts I and II of this Essay,
there is little reason to think that Congress will change its practices.
Lawmaker disinterest in the pursuit of common goods like constitutional
interpretation and the absence of a federalism constituency will remain
substantial roadblocks to constitutional review by Congress. Moreover,
party polarization exacerbates these roadblocks; today’s Congress is far less
interested in the Constitution than earlier Congresses. The ACA is a product
of its times, and judicial limits on congressional power seem sensible in this
context.
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